Refactor Auth Commands for Session Management

I've now got the full picture. Here's my brainstorm.

Bottom line

• The "two views" are really two separate problems wearing one label: (1) two credential stores under the hood, and (2) two commands (auth list vs auth contexts) that actually show different things. Only #1 gates the refresh work.
• Good news: the read-side port is already ~done. Almost every API call already resolves its token context-first via ContextStore/LookupCurrentToken, falling back to the legacy keyring profile. What's missing is refresh-capability, not context-awareness.
• The actual COR-389 gap is narrow and precise: the control-plane manager uses a read-only store that drops the refresh token, has no RefreshPath, and is keyed to static AuthBaseURL instead of the active context's core. The refresh-capable machinery already exists (contextTokenStore + the per-context manager in NewRefreshingLoginProvider) — it's just only wired to git-remote-entire.
• I'd argue refresh can ship before the UX consolidation, contrary to how the issue sequences it. The store collapse is the real prerequisite; the command-surface cleanup is independent and can stack on top.

The two stores (the thing to collapse)

The consolidation = make the control-plane manager use the refresh-capable, context-bound store. That's literally generalizing NewRefreshingLoginProvider's construction into defaultManager.

Concrete fix shape (COR-389)

1. Factor out a newContextManager(c *contexts.Context, ...) helper from NewRefreshingLoginProvider that builds a tokenmanager with Issuer = c.CoreURL, Store = contextTokenStore{c.KeychainService, c.Handle}, both STSPath and RefreshPath set. (Verify auth-go's tokenmanager.Config accepts both grant endpoints simultaneously — NewRefreshingLoginProvider only sets RefreshPath, defaultManager only sets STSPath; nobody sets both yet.)
2. defaultManager(): resolve the active context first. Have a context → build the refresh-capable context-bound manager. No context (legacy-only user) → fall back to today's AuthBaseURL + legacy Store, no refresh. The sync.Once singleton is fine — each CLI command is a fresh process, so the active context is fixed per invocation.
3. RepoScopedToken: its "no refresh token exists" premise is now false (RecordLoginContext stores one). But you can't just call mgr.TokenForResource — the data-plane git gate keys on audience only and the manager emits a resource param too. So: refresh the subject token via the manager, then keep the existing direct STS exchange byte-for-byte. Refresh-then-exchange.
4. Multi-core issuer: because the manager now takes Issuer from the active context's CoreURL, control-plane commands finally target the right core — which lets you delete the warnIfCrossCoreContext warning in auth use.
5. Legacy migration: call the existing idempotent MigrateLegacyLoginContext() on the control-plane path (or just fall back gracefully). No refresh token = same behavior as today; nothing regresses.

Proposed PR stack

• PR 1 — Refresh-capable control-plane tokens (COR-389 core). Steps 1–3 above + tests asserting an expired login JWT is transparently re-minted before STS exchange on entire status/search/dispatch, and RepoScopedToken survives expiry. Self-contained, highest value.
• PR 2 — Multi-core issuer + drop the auth use warning (step 4). Could fold into PR1; separate if you want a clean diff.
• PR 3 — Command-surface consolidation (auth list ↔ auth contexts). Pure UX/deprecation, no token-path risk.

This sequencing de-risks: the security/refresh win lands first and independently of any UX churn.

The one real product decision

auth list and auth contexts show different things — list hits the server for your API/PAT tokens, contexts reads local login identities from contexts.json. "Sunset the deprecated list" can't be a literal merge without deciding what happens to API-token management. That's your call:

Now I have the full picture, including the decisive fact: entire login never creates one of these tokens. It runs pure OAuth device flow and stores a JWT + refresh token. So let me answer your question directly.

Bottom line

• These "API tokens" are server-side personal access tokens (PATs) — long-lived DB rows on entire-core (id, user_id, name, scope, expires_at, last_used_at), distinct from your login JWT and refresh token. The plaintext value is never returned by list.
• They are the original, pre-OIDC auth primitive. The path /api/v1/auth/tokens exists for both the v1 (legacy single-host) and v2 providers and predates the whole JWT/STS/refresh world (PR #1337).
• The CLI cannot create them — there's only list, revoke, revoke --current. Creation happens elsewhere (web dashboard, or a server-side side-effect). Device-flow login does not mint one.
• Your instinct is right: in the OIDC world the login JWT + per-resource STS exchange is the universal credential, and PATs are a parallel legacy mechanism. But whether they can be deleted entirely is an entire-core question, not a CLI one — see the caveat below.

Where PATs actually touch the CLI (the entire blast radius)

Only four call sites, all in auth.go/logout.go:

That's it. Nothing else in the CLI depends on the PAT endpoints. So "phasing them out" from the CLI is really decoupling status/logout from the PAT endpoints and routing them through JWT+STS+refresh — it doesn't require the server to delete PATs first.

The one caveat (an entire-core decision, not CLI)

The legitimate reason PATs exist is non-interactive automation — CI, scripts, service accounts where you can't run an interactive device-flow login and don't want a 1-hour JWT. Two sub-questions live in entire-core, not here:

1. Does login mint/alias a PAT server-side? RevokeCurrentToken revoking "the bearer used to authenticate this client" only makes sense if the server maps your JWT session back to a revocable row. If it does, logout's current behavior is load-bearing and must be replaced with a real session/refresh-token revocation endpoint — not just deleted.
2. What's the non-interactive auth story without PATs? If the answer is "long-lived bearer for CI," you can't kill the concept — only stop surfacing it in the interactive CLI. If entire-core gains JWT-native machine auth (client-credentials grant, scoped service tokens), then PATs can truly die.

So the revised plan shape

1. PR1 (unchanged): refresh-capable, context-bound control-plane tokens (COR-389 core). Pure JWT+STS+refresh. Independent of PATs.
2. PR2: cut the CLI's PAT dependency. Rewrite auth status to validate the JWT (local exp check or /userinfo), and rewrite logout to revoke the refresh-token/session via a JWT-native endpoint. After this, auth is 100% JWT/STS — no PAT calls.
3. PR3: retire auth list/auth revoke (the PAT CRUD), gated on the entire-core answer to caveat #2.

Two things I'd want to confirm against entire-core before locking PR2/PR3: (a) does the device-flow/session leave a revocable server-side record that logout must clear, and (b) is there (or will there be) a JWT-native non-interactive auth path so PATs can be fully retired.

Do you have entire-core checked out / accessible? If so I can verify the /api/v1/auth/tokens semantics and whether a token-revocation (/oauth/revoke-style) endpoint already exists, rather than us guessing at the backend contract.

You're right, and I overclaimed. "Everything already uses JWT" was wrong. But the reality is more interesting than "checkpoints/search use PATs" — there are actually three distinct credential systems, and I'd conflated them. Here's the corrected, traced picture.

Bottom line

• I was wrong to say everything is JWT. But the non-JWT paths are not the /api/v1/auth/tokens PATs either. There are three separate systems.
• entire search is actually JWT — despite a misleadingly-named field. Checkpoint push/fetch uses a git-host token (ENTIRE_CHECKPOINT_TOKEN, GitHub-style), supplied via env, not entire-core auth at all — except for entire:// remotes, which go through the JWT+refresh path.
• The PATs shown by entire auth list are a third, orthogonal thing the CLI only lists/revokes.

The three credential systems

1. entire-core control + data plane → JWT + STS (refresh is COR-389) status, search, activity, dispatch, recap, trail, org/repo/project/grant all resolve through auth.TokenForResource → login JWT, exchanged per-resource via STS.

The trap you sensed: entire search populates search.Config.GitHubToken (search_cmd.go:120) and sends it as Bearer (search/search.go:277). The field name is a lie — resolveSearchToken (search_cmd.go:215) returns auth.TokenForResource(...), i.e. the STS-exchanged entire-core JWT, not a GitHub token. So search is on the JWT path; the legacy name just makes it look like it isn't. (Worth renaming as cleanup.)

2. Checkpoint git push/fetch → ENTIRE_CHECKPOINT_TOKEN (git-host credential, NOT JWT) checkpoint/remote/git.go:26 reads ENTIRE_CHECKPOINT_TOKEN and injects it as HTTP Basic auth in GitHub's x-access-token:<token> form (git.go:467) for HTTPS remotes. It's:

• never sourced from the keyring — only os.Getenv. Something external (dispatch/CI orchestration) sets it; test fixtures use ghp_test123-style values → it's a GitHub/git-host token.
• bypassed for entire:// remotes — those route through git-remote-entire, which does use the JWT+refresh path (NewRefreshingLoginProvider). I'm confident on the env/Basic-auth path; the "entire:// uses git-remote-entire instead" branch I'm inferring from the protocol routing and should confirm.

So checkpoints-to-GitHub use a git token; checkpoints-to-entire use the JWT. No PATs involved.

3. /api/v1/auth/tokens PATs → only auth list/revoke/status liveness/logout The server-side personal access tokens. The CLI's own data/control calls don't use them; only the auth-management commands touch them.

What this means for your goal

• The milestone this sits under is "Phase 2 — Entire-only Repos." That matters: in an entire-only world, checkpoint push goes entire:// → git-remote-entire → JWT+refresh. The ENTIRE_CHECKPOINT_TOKEN/GitHub path is the legacy-host compatibility path that becomes irrelevant as repos move to entire-hosting. So convergence on JWT is the natural end state — system #2's non-JWT branch fades with GitHub.
• COR-389 (JWT refresh) covers system #1 fully, plus the entire:// branch of #2 (already done). It does not touch ENTIRE_CHECKPOINT_TOKEN (a git-host secret — not the CLI's to refresh) or the PATs.
• Your "phase out API tokens in favour of STS+JWT" is really about system #3 (the auth list PATs) + the misleading GitHubToken naming in #1 — neither of which the data/checkpoint paths actually depend on.

Two things I should confirm rather than assert, since I already got it wrong once: (a) that entire:// checkpoint pushes truly skip ENTIRE_CHECKPOINT_TOKEN and go through git-remote-entire's JWT path, and (b) where ENTIRE_CHECKPOINT_TOKEN actually gets set at runtime (dispatch? cloud orchestration? CI?) — that tells us whether any entire-core PAT is being funneled in as the checkpoint token. Want me to trace those two before we lock the plan?

Confirmed the key fact from the CLI side: there is no code path in this CLI that creates a PAT. Zero POSTs to /api/v1/auth/tokens, no "create token" anywhere. So you're not imagining it — you never explicitly asked for them.

Bottom line

• The CLI only ever lists and revokes these tokens. It never mints one. entire login is pure device-flow OAuth: it receives access_token + refresh_token and stores them locally — no server-side "create a PAT" call.
• Therefore the rows in auth list are minted server-side by entire-core, not by anything you typed. The overwhelmingly likely explanation: entire-core records each issued OAuth access token / device-code session as a row in the same table /api/v1/auth/tokens reads. So every entire login (per machine, per re-auth) silently produces one — which is exactly why you see tokens you don't recall creating, and why they accumulate.

The tell that ties it together

This hypothesis is backed by how logout and status behave:

• logout / revoke --current → DELETE /api/v1/auth/tokens/current ("revoke the bearer I authenticated with"). That only works if your login JWT/session maps to a row in that table.
• auth status probes liveness by calling ListTokens — "can I list ⇒ my bearer is still valid."

So the "PATs" and "your JWT login session" are very likely the same server-side object viewed two ways, not a separate credential type you'd create. The /api/v1/auth/tokens table looks like entire-core's session/issued-token registry, and auth list is just a window onto it.

Why this matters for "phasing them out"

If that's right, then "kill the PATs" isn't "stop creating a separate credential" — it's stop surfacing the session registry as a user-facing token list, and replace:

• auth status liveness probe → local JWT exp check or a /userinfo-style call (no PAT endpoint).
• logout → a proper session/refresh-token revocation (RFC 7009 /oauth/revoke), not DELETE …/tokens/current.

The server may well keep tracking issued tokens for revocation/audit — you'd just stop calling it "API tokens" in the CLI. Whether there's also a genuine long-lived-PAT-for-CI use case (web-dashboard-created, or via CreateServiceAccount which exists in coreapi) is the remaining unknown.

I can't see the creation semantics from this repo — it's entirely an entire-core question. Do you have entire-core checked out somewhere I can read? The two things I'd confirm: (1) does the device-code/OAuth grant insert a row into the auth/tokens table (one-per-login), and (2) is there a separate dashboard/service-account PAT-creation path. That settles whether auth list is a session registry or a real PAT store — which decides whether PR3 is a rename or a removal.

Traced end-to-end in entiredb. This resolves the whole confusion — and your premise was slightly off, in a way that matters.

Bottom line

• Yes, the machinery lives in entiredb: core/api/auth_tokens.go + routes in core/api/server.go:919-925 (GET /api/auth/tokens, DELETE /api/auth/tokens/current, DELETE /api/auth/tokens/{family_id}). Core serves it at /api/auth/tokens; entire.io's data API exposes the same wire shape at /api/v1/auth/tokens (which is what the CLI's v2 provider targets).
• These are NOT PATs. They are OAuth refresh-token families = your login sessions. There is no personal-access-token creation endpoint anywhere. Each entire login (device-code grant) creates exactly one family. You never "created" them because logging in is creating them. The CLI's "API token" labeling is just wrong.
• They are not used to authenticate requests. RP verification is deliberately stateless — JWT signature + claims only, zero lookups against this table. The families table is touched only on refresh/exchange and revocation.
• So "phase them out in favour of STS+JWT" is a category error: they already are the refresh half of the JWT system. There's nothing to replace — only a CLI UX to relabel/consolidate.

Field mapping (what auth list is really showing)

What breaks if the CLI stops calling these endpoints — traced, not assumed

Everything else is independent of these three handlers: login (device/auth-code grant), refresh rotation (reads refresh_tokens directly, not via the API), JWT validation (stateless), STS/token-exchange (gated internally by IsFamilyAlive, COR-309), git push/pull. Login, refresh, exchange, and request-auth all keep working if you delete list and revoke-by-id.

One sharp edge worth flagging (this is the Security label on COR-389): revoking a family stops future refresh/exchange, but in-flight access tokens stay valid until their own TTL (login JWT up to 8h) — RPs don't consult the family. So revocation is eventual, bounded by TTL. That's by design, but it means logout isn't instant.

What this means for the plan

The whole "consolidate two views + sunset PATs" goal collapses into something much cleaner:

1. auth list isn't a competing credential system — it's a "list my active login sessions" feature, mislabeled. It and auth contexts are complementary: contexts = local identities stored on this machine; auth list = server-side sessions across all your devices. Consolidation = relabel auth list as sessions (or fold into auth status), not delete a credential type.
2. You can safely drop auth list + auth revoke <id> from the CLI surface with zero functional fallout — they're convenience/observability only.
3. Keep a session-revocation path for logout. DELETE …/tokens/current is the only server-side "end my session" mechanism today (no RFC 7009 /oauth/revoke exists in entiredb). If you strip the auth/tokens family entirely, logout regresses to local-delete-only and the server-side family lingers 30d. So either keep /current, or add a proper /oauth/revoke to entiredb first.
4. COR-389 is unaffected and orthogonal: wiring contextTokenStore + RefreshPath into the control-plane manager makes the CLI consume these families for silent refresh. That's the real work, and it doesn't touch the list/revoke UI at all.

Want me to save this finding (it took a cross-repo trace to establish) and then sketch the revised PR stack around "relabel sessions + keep /current + wire refresh"?

Saved.

Done:

• Comment posted to COR-389.
• Finding stashed in project memory (auth-tokens-are-refresh-families) + indexed in MEMORY.md, so the cross-repo trace survives into future sessions.

We're on branch auth-context-consolidation with no code changes yet — pure investigation so far. When you want to pick the implementation back up, the natural first PR is the orthogonal COR-389 core (wire contextTokenStore + RefreshPath into defaultManager), with the auth list → "active sessions" relabel as a separate stacked PR.

Committed (81525fa571). Now — your URL question, which I traced before editing:

Does Logged in to https://us.auth.entire.io come from the selected context?

No. That URL is api.AuthBaseURL() (base_url.go:59) = ENTIRE_AUTH_BASE_URL env var, or the compiled default https://us.auth.entire.io. It never reads contexts.json. It's completely independent of which context entire auth contexts shows as active.

There's a subtle split worth knowing:

So auth status validates the active context's token but prints the static auth host as the label. In the normal case they're the same origin, so it looks correct. But if your active context is on a different core (CoreURL ≠ AuthBaseURL), status would validate one identity and label it with a different host — exactly the mismatch warnIfCrossCoreContext already warns about on auth use (auth_context.go:51).

This is a known COR-389 item

The issue's "Proposed scope" explicitly lists: "Resolve issuer/store from the active context, not api.AuthBaseURL()." Fixing the status label is the display-facing half of that; the load-bearing half is retargeting the actual control-plane call to the active context's core. They should land together — making the label say the context's CoreURL while the call still hits AuthBaseURL would just move the lie.

My recommendation: leave the status label as-is for now (it's honest about where the call goes), and fix it properly as part of the COR-389 manager retargeting — at which point status naturally shows the active context's core because that's where it authenticates. Want me to add that as a task too, so it's tracked alongside the rename and contexts-table TODOs?

Task list locked in:

I'd execute in that order: #3 (user-visible, coherent with the change just shipped) → #2 (table treatment, can share helpers with #3's neighborhood) → #1 last (pure rename touching the api package — least conflict if done after the behavior changes settle), each as its own commit.

Want me to start cranking through them now, or are more TODOs coming first?

All four tasks done, each its own commit, tree clean.

Shipped (branch auth-context-consolidation, 4 commits on top of main)

Each passed go build, mise run fmt, golangci-lint (0 issues), and the cli + api unit tests. I did not run the full integration/canary suite (mise run check) — say the word if you want it before you push.

Two things I flagged but didn't action (your call)

• auth.RemoveAllContexts is now dead in production (only its own test references it). I left it — removing exported, tested API felt like a separate deliberate decision. Want it gone?
• auth status still labels with api.AuthBaseURL(), not the active context's core (your earlier URL question). That's the COR-389 multi-core retargeting — I didn't fold it in here since making status show the context's core without retargeting the actual call would just relocate the inconsistency. Want me to add it as a task?

Nothing pushed (per your usual). Tasks #1–3 are marked complete in the list.

Done — RemoveAllContexts and its test are gone (d7c3ded908). Build, fmt, lint (0 issues), and the auth package tests all pass.

Branch auth-context-consolidation now has 5 commits on top of main. One open item still on the table from before: whether to add a task for retargeting auth status's URL to the active context's core (the COR-389 multi-core piece). Say the word and I'll track it.

Done — b798673a42. entire auth status now leads with a profile header from core GET /me and keeps the active-sessions table below.

What it produces

Key behaviours:

• /me is the liveness gate — a 401 (now surfaced as *coreapi.ErrorModelStatusCode and recognised by isKeychainTokenRejected) prints the "no longer valid → re-login" hint, same as before.
• Session list is secondary/soft — token's already known good, so a list failure becomes a stderr warning rather than failing the command.
• Empty fields omitted — if the server doesn't return display name/email/etc., those parts drop out cleanly.

Build, fmt, lint (0 issues), and the cli + api + auth test suites all pass. Six commits now stacked on auth-context-consolidation; nothing pushed.

One note for whenever you tackle the COR-389 retargeting: /me is fetched from coreapi.New(), which targets api.AuthBaseURL() — so the same static-vs-active-context caveat from the status URL applies here too. When the control-plane manager gets retargeted to the active context's core, this profile call follows automatically.

Nothing to commit — the working tree is clean. The /me profile work is already committed as b798673a42 (the last step ran git add -A && git commit).

Current top of auth-context-consolidation:

Nothing pending. If you made a local edit you expected me to pick up, it's not showing in this worktree — let me know and I'll check.

Confirmed, and this is more than a small bug — it reveals we've been pointing at the wrong service for "sessions" all along. Here's the full picture.

Bottom line

• Yes, address it. The error is from entire.io's api/src/routes/api-tokens.ts:86 — and that endpoint isn't login sessions at all. It's the ent_ personal-access-token surface.
• Its DELETE /current only works for callers who authenticated with an ent_ bearer; a JWT login has no apiTokenId, so it 400s with exactly your message. That's by design on their side.
• So our newSessionsClient (→ api.BaseURL() = entire.io, path /api/v1/auth/tokens) is hitting the deprecated PAT endpoint, not entire-core's session/family endpoint. Consequences:
  • auth status "Active sessions" is actually listing your ent_ PATs → empty for a normal JWT login (you've never made one), so the table silently shows nothing useful.
  • logout's server-side revoke 400s, as you saw.

The two "auth/tokens" surfaces mirror each other's wire shape but are different things on different hosts:

The fix

Repoint session list + revoke at entire-core: host api.AuthBaseURL(), path /api/auth/tokens, bearer resolved for the auth-host origin. I verified the two things that make this work:

• The login JWT carries entire:session scope (LoginScopes in core/authn/scopes.go), which is exactly what entire-core's RequireSession gate on those routes demands. A same-host token resolution returns the login JWT unchanged (no STS exchange to strip the scope).
• entire-core serves GET/DELETE /api/auth/tokens[/current|/{family_id}] with the same {tokens:[…]} wire shape, so the existing api.Session decoding and RevokeCurrentSession/RevokeSession paths just work — only the host+path change.

Net effect: auth status shows your real login sessions, and logout revokes the family server-side. The CLI stops touching entire.io's PAT endpoint entirely — which aligns with your "phase out the PATs" goal.

This contradicts the old in-code assumption (provider.go: "API token management lives on the data API") — that comment was written against the PAT endpoint and is now wrong for sessions.

It's a security-sensitive routing change to login/logout, so I want your nod before I repoint it. Want me to implement Direction A (session list+revoke → entire-core /api/auth/tokens), with tests and the provider/comment cleanup?

Good catch — you're right to call that out. I conflated two different objects across two services, and my "not used for anything" was about the wrong one. Here's the honest reconciliation.

What I actually traced vs. what these are

• Earlier I traced entire-core's /api/auth/tokens → refresh-token families (login sessions). "Not on the request-auth hot path, only refresh/revocation bookkeeping" — that's still true for that endpoint.
• I never traced entire.io's ent_ tokens. They're a different thing, and they are used.

What ent_ PATs are and do (now traced)

• They're entire.io's own data-API bearer credential. middleware.ts:requireBearerAuth accepts a bearer that's either an ent_ token (hashed, looked up in db.apiTokens, sets userId/scope/apiTokenId) or an entire-core JWT. So an ent_ token authenticates real data-API requests — search, activity, trails, dispatch.
• They're minted by entire.io's own device flow (cli-auth.ts → db.apiTokens.create with a tokenHash). This is the pre-JWT CLI login mechanism: old entire login got an ent_ PAT from entire.io and used it as the bearer for everything.
• The migration off them is already underway: ENTIRE_CORE_BEARER_ENABLED makes entire.io also accept entire-core JWTs as the bearer (validateCoreJwt), with a comment literally noting JWT callers have no apiTokenId and must revoke via entire-core.

So the reconciliation

The key point that rescues both statements: today's CLI doesn't mint or authenticate with ent_ PATs. It logs in via entire-core (gets a core JWT) and entire.io accepts that JWT directly. ent_ PATs are the legacy credential — still real and usable for external scripting/CI, but vestigial for the interactive CLI. That's exactly the thing your original "phase out PATs in favour of STS+JWT" was aiming at — and the CLI is already most of the way there for auth; it just still points its session list/revoke UI at the PAT endpoint by mistake.

Bearing on the fix

This strengthens Direction A, not weakens it:

• auth status's "active sessions" should show entire-core login sessions, not entire.io ent_ PATs (which are empty for a JWT login and aren't "sessions" anyway).
• logout should revoke the core session/family, not poke the PAT endpoint (which 400s).

So: repoint session list+revoke to entire-core /api/auth/tokens, and the CLI stops touching the ent_ PAT surface entirely. Want me to go ahead with that?

Done — fffb536bee. Clean tree.

What this fixed

The 400 you hit was real and now traced to root cause: auth status and logout were aimed at entire.io's /api/v1/auth/tokens — the legacy ent_ PAT surface — which rejects JWT callers. Since the CLI never mints or sends ent_ PATs, it had no business there.

Now:

• auth status is local: GET /me (profile + liveness) + the active login context. No PAT endpoint, no empty session list.

• logout revokes the session against entire-core /api/auth/tokens/current (and --all lists+revokes every session on the core), using the session-scoped login JWT.

Build, fmt, lint (0 issues), and the cli/api/auth suites all pass. Seven commits now on auth-context-consolidation.

One thing to verify on your end: I can't exercise this against your local core, so please run entire auth status and entire logout against your local entire-core — that confirms the /api/auth/tokens routing + entire:session scope behave as traced. The warning should be gone and logout should actually revoke server-side.

Two cleanups I'm holding unless you want them: (a) the ent_ PAT correction means the earlier COR-389 Linear comment / auth-tokens-are-refresh-families memory are now incomplete (they describe core's families but not the entire.io PAT surface) — I can update them; (b) provider.AuthTokensPath (/api/v1/auth/tokens) is now unused by the CLI and could be dropped. Say the word.

Verified — and you've caught a genuinely loose bit of wording on my part. Let me make it precise.

The reconciliation (with proof)

Both statements are true, but my "data-API bearer credential" phrasing was sloppy. The accurate model:

The data API (entire.io) accepts two bearer types (requireBearerAuth): an ent_ PAT or a core JWT (validateCoreJwt, gated by ENTIRE_CORE_BEARER_ENABLED).

The CLI only ever sends the core JWT. Verified just now:

• The CLI has zero ent_/PAT handling in its code (the grep hits are all unrelated — agent_id, etc., plus the comment I added).
• Every data-API client gets its bearer from auth.TokenForResource(...) (api_client.go:44) → the STS-exchanged core JWT, not a PAT.
• entire login runs the device flow against api.AuthBaseURL() = entire-core, so it stores a core JWT — it never mints an ent_.

So:

"ent_ is a data-API bearer credential" = what that token can do. "The CLI never uses PATs" = the CLI sends the other accepted bearer. No contradiction — but I should have said "a credential the data API accepts" the first time. My bad.

What this means for reinstating auth list

It collapses the case. Since the CLI never touches PATs for its own operation, reinstating auth list/revoke is purely a management tool for PATs minted elsewhere (dashboard / CI / legacy). It's not load-bearing for the CLI in any sense — the CLI is fully functional, today, with PATs completely absent from its code.

So the real question isn't "do we need them" (we don't) — it's "do we want the CLI to be a place to view and revoke PATs a user created elsewhere." That's a product call:

• Yes → reinstate as an honest auth list/auth tokens PAT surface (hygiene: revoke a leaked CI token from the terminal).
• No → leave it out; PAT lifecycle lives in the dashboard, CLI stays JWT-only. Given your "phase out PATs" goal and that the CLI doesn't use them, this is the more consistent path.

Which way do you want to go?

Done — f743eb58e5. Clean tree.

What got burned

• Provider.AuthTokensPath field + its /api/v1/auth/tokens values + tests — gone. Nothing in the repo references entire-web's PAT path anymore (verified: /api/v1/auth/tokens grep is empty).
• PAT-era naming renamed to sessions: api/auth_tokens.go → api/sessions.go, WithAuthTokensPath → WithSessionsPath, authTokensPath → sessionsPath, errAuthTokensPathUnset → errSessionsPathUnset.
• PAT / ent_ / personal-access-token prose scrubbed from comments.

Logout endpoint — confirmed correct

Traced and verified: every logout request goes to entire-core (api.AuthBaseURL()) at /api/auth/tokens[/current|/{id}] with the session-scoped core JWT. The only data-host (api.BaseURL()) reference left is the TLS guard, not a request target. That 400 from entire-web's PAT endpoint cannot recur — the path no longer exists in the CLI.

Build, fmt, lint (0 issues), and the cli/api/auth suites all pass. Eight commits now on auth-context-consolidation.

Two leftovers, your call:

• The earlier COR-389 Linear comment and the auth-tokens-are-refresh-families memory predate the ent_-PAT discovery — they describe entire-core's families but not the entire.io PAT distinction. Want me to correct them so the record isn't misleading?
• I did not run the full mise run test:ci (integration + canary) — say the word before you push and I'll run it.

You won't hear about ent_ PATs from me again.

Both updated.

• Linear COR-389 comment — added a prominent correction banner at the top and a full ⚠️ CORRECTION section at the bottom: the original trace was entire-core's families, but the CLI was actually hitting entire.io's /api/v1/auth/tokens (ent_ PATs, a separate surface being sunset). Documents the bug, the two-surface distinction, and what shipped (PATs burned, status local-only, logout → entire-core). The original text is preserved with the banner flagging that it's superseded.

• Memory — replaced the misleading auth-tokens-are-refresh-families with auth-token-surfaces, which captures both surfaces correctly, the key fact that the CLI never uses ent_ PATs, the bug, and the resolution. Index (MEMORY.md) updated; old file deleted.

The record now reflects reality: session management → entire-core auth host, always; entire.io's ent_ PAT endpoint is sunset and the CLI never touches it.

Branch auth-context-consolidation stands at 8 commits, clean tree, nothing pushed. Still on the table whenever you want it: running the full mise run test:ci before you push.

Bottom line: we materially simplified the auth command surface and fixed a real logout bug, but the headline COR-389 deliverable — auto-refreshing JWTs on control-plane calls — hasn't been touched yet. A lot of the work was discovery that corrected our mental model mid-flight.

The original goal (start of session)

COR-389: consolidate the two auth views (auth list vs auth contexts), port API calls onto the context-aware path, and get silent JWT refresh on every control-plane call. Broadly: make auth/logins simpler.

UX: before → after

Net: two commands removed, the confusing/empty/erroring server calls gone, status now actually tells you who you are, and the ent_ PAT concept is fully eliminated from the CLI.

What shipped (8 commits, branch auth-context-consolidation)

• Dropped auth list + auth revoke; folded session teardown into logout.
• auth status → local profile + context (/me for liveness/identity).
• Styled auth contexts table.
• api.Token → api.Session rename; removed dead RemoveAllContexts.
• Critical fix: session list/revoke was hitting entire.io's ent_ PAT endpoint (→ empty lists, 400 on logout). Repointed to entire-core /api/auth/tokens; burned all PAT plumbing.
• Corrected the COR-389 Linear comment + memory to reflect the two-surface reality.

Worth flagging: there was real churn — I added an "active sessions" table, then removed it once we discovered it was listing PATs, not sessions. The course-corrections were the cost of the wrong initial model.

What's NOT done

• The actual COR-389 core: silent refresh. Wiring contextTokenStore + RefreshPath into defaultManager so control-plane calls re-mint expired JWTs. Untouched. This was the primary ask.
• Multi-core retargeting — auth status/control-plane still target static AuthBaseURL, not the active context's core.
• Verification — none of this is exercised against your live local core, and I haven't run mise run test:ci. Nothing pushed.

So: auth UX is meaningfully simpler and a latent logout bug is fixed, but if the session's success criterion is "JWTs auto-refresh," we've cleared the prerequisites and haven't yet done the refresh wiring itself.

Bottom line: auth status is hitting the wrong core. This is the multi-core targeting gap we deferred, now biting — plus a second bug where the resulting 401 prints raw instead of a friendly message.

What's happening

Your active context is eu.auth.entire.io, but auth status calls GET /me against api.AuthBaseURL() — a static host (ENTIRE_AUTH_BASE_URL or the us.auth.entire.io default), not your active context's core. So it's sending your eu session token to a different core, which 401s. Two distinct defects:

1. Wrong target (the real bug): auth status / coreapi ignore the active context and use the static AuthBaseURL. auth use switches the context but control-plane calls don't follow — exactly the "does the status URL come from the context?" gap I flagged earlier (answer was "no"). Your two-core setup is the case that breaks it.
2. Ugly error (secondary): that 401 comes back as text/plain, so the ogen client fails to decode it and surfaces decode response: ... (code 401). My isKeychainTokenRejected only catches a typed ErrorModelStatusCode 401, so it misses this shape and falls through to the raw validate token: message instead of "token no longer valid — re-login."

One thing to confirm

What does ENTIRE_AUTH_BASE_URL resolve to? Run:

• If it's not eu.auth.entire.io → confirmed cross-core mismatch (#1 is the cause).
• If it is eu.auth.entire.io → then /me is genuinely 401'ing your token (expired/scope), and #2 (the friendly-message fix) is the main thing.

Proposed fix

Either way I'll harden #2 (a 401 in any shape → friendly re-login message). The bigger fix for #1: make auth status resolve the active context's CoreURL + its token and call /me there (falling back to AuthBaseURL only when there's no active context). That makes auth use actually retarget status — and is a down payment on the COR-389 multi-core retargeting for the rest of the control plane.

Confirm the env value and I'll implement — I'd rather not guess the root cause a third time this session.

Done — ae7d63c1ad, clean tree.

What this fixes

Your exact failure: auth status was querying /me on the static AuthBaseURL, so with eu.auth.entire.io active it sent that context's token to the wrong core → 401 → and the text/plain 401 body made ogen barf the raw decode response: ... dump.

• auth status is now context-aware. resolveStatusTarget picks the active context's CoreURL + its session token; /me hits that login server. auth use finally retargets status, and "Logged in to …" shows the active context's core. Falls back to AuthBaseURL + legacy entry only when no context is active.
• coreapi.NewWithBearer(coreURL, token) added — hits a specific core with a fixed bearer (no STS), which is what status needs.
• The ugly error is gone: a non-JSON 401 now maps to the friendly "Login for … is no longer valid → run entire login" message.
• TLS-guarded the resolved core URL before sending the token.

Tests: rewrote the status suite for the new shape, added TestRunAuthStatus_QueriesActiveContextCore (proves it hits the active core/token), TestResolveStatusTarget_PrefersActiveContext, and a table case pinning the exact (code 401) text/plain regression. All green; lint clean.

This is the multi-core retargeting — scoped to auth status — that we'd deferred. Please re-run entire auth status with eu.auth.entire.io active; you should now see your profile from eu's /me instead of the 401.

Nine commits on auth-context-consolidation. Note the same static-AuthBaseURL issue still affects the other control-plane commands (org/repo/project/grant via coreapi.New()) — out of scope here, part of the broader COR-389 retargeting. Want that captured as a task before you push?

My 9 commits stack cleanly on wiggly-marinating-origami. PR #1337 ("auth: silent login-token refresh", branch auth-silent-token-refresh) is the work we spun off from — let me confirm the spinoff point matches it so I set the PR base correctly for stacking:

Draft PR up: https://github.com/entireio/cli/pull/1341 (base main, 9 commits).

Handover

Goal (COR-389 + your follow-ups): consolidate the two auth views, get the CLI fully onto the context-aware/JWT model, and ultimately auto-refresh JWTs on every control-plane call. Broadly: make auth/login UX coherent.

Where we got to — shipped in #1341:

• Auth command surface trimmed from 7 → 5: dropped auth list + auth revoke.
• auth status is now context-aware: profile via /me on the active context's core, shows identity + active context. auth use finally retargets it.
• auth contexts → styled table. logout revokes server-side via entire-core (--all = all sessions on the core).
• Burned all ent_ PAT machinery — the CLI never used PATs; that surface is being sunset.

Key thing we learned (the expensive lesson): there are two same-shaped "auth/tokens" surfaces — entire-core /api/auth/tokens (login sessions) vs entire.io /api/v1/auth/tokens (legacy ent_ PATs). The CLI was wrongly hitting the PAT one for "sessions" → empty lists + logout 400s. Everything now targets entire-core. Full write-up in the COR-389 Linear comment (corrected) and memory auth-token-surfaces.

What's NOT done (next session):

1. The actual COR-389 deliverable — silent JWT refresh on control-plane calls (contextTokenStore + RefreshPath into defaultManager). Untouched. This is the real prize; everything so far was prerequisite + cleanup.
2. Multi-core retargeting for the rest of the control plane — org/repo/project/grant (via coreapi.New()) still use static AuthBaseURL. Only auth status was retargeted. Same bug pattern as the one we just fixed.

Verification gaps: Go lint clean, per-package tests green; full mise run test:ci (integration + canary) not run. None of it exercised against a live core — please sanity-check entire auth status / logout against your local eu.auth.entire.io.

PR is draft so CI can run; flip to ready when you've eyeballed it. Nothing else pushed.

Bottom line: yes, it survived the plot twist — the name is accurate now, and the type still earns its keep. But it's leaner-justified than when we did it.

• api.Session is correct for the endpoint we now hit. We renamed it believing entire.io's rows were sessions (they were PATs — wrong at the time). But the later repoint to entire-core /api/auth/tokens made the "session" framing genuinely true: that endpoint really does return login/refresh-token families. So we landed on the right name, partly by luck.
• It's still used — by logout --all: ListSessions → enumerate families → RevokeSession(id). And RevokeCurrentSession for default logout. So api.Session / SessionsResponse / the three methods all have a live caller against entire-core. Not dead code.
• coreapi.NewWithBearer is actively used by auth status to hit /me on the active context's core — needed, keep.

Honest caveat: auth status no longer renders a session table, so of api.Session's fields only ID is actually consumed now (by --all); Scope/ExpiresAt/LastUsedAt/CreatedAt are decoded-but-unused wire-shape mirror. Mild dead weight — could trim to {ID}, but it's harmless and matches the server contract, so not worth more churn in an already-big PR.

So: keep it. If anything, the only thing that changed meaning under us was resolved in our favour — the rename that looked speculative mid-session is the right name for the entire-core endpoint we ended on.

Done. Pushed and PR updated.

What I added this round (commit f9b8c3e707)

• auth status now shows the active sessions table — NAME / CREATED / LAST USED / EXPIRES on the active context's core, after the profile/context lines, ending with: "Run 'entire logout' to end this session, or 'entire logout --all' to end all of them." So the table directly explains what logout does. Listing failure is a soft note (liveness already confirmed via /me).
• logout now targets the same core the table lists — via the shared resolveStatusTarget, so logout/--all act on exactly the sessions you see, not a static AuthBaseURL. That closes the same multi-core mismatch for logout that we'd just fixed for status.
• newSessionsClient takes an explicit coreURL.

The table genuinely makes sense now precisely because it's the real entire-core session list (the thing we spent the session untangling from the ent_ PAT confusion).

Verified: build, fmt, lint (0 issues), and cli/api/auth/coreapi tests all green.

State

• PR #1341 (draft, main): now 10 commits, description updated to reflect the table + logout retargeting. https://github.com/entireio/cli/pull/1341
• Pushed.

One small follow-up I flagged in the PR body rather than chase in an already-big PR: resolveAuthHostToken is now prod-unused (only its tests keep it alive) — a prune candidate. And the broader silent-refresh (COR-389 core) + retargeting org/repo/grant remain the next chunks.

Please give entire auth status and entire logout a spin against eu.auth.entire.io when you can — that's the real-world confirmation I couldn't do from here.

Done — that confirms it. entire.io's auth host isn't behind CF Access at all (no bypasses needed → login just works). partial.to is the internal zone that gates *.auth.partial.to behind Access, so each non-browser OAuth/OIDC endpoint needs an explicit bypass. I extended the existing auth_token_bypass app exactly the way /oauth/token is already handled.

Change (in ~/src/entirehq/infra, working tree)

cloudflare/partial.to/apps.tf — added to the auth_token_bypass app's destinations:

(+ updated the app name and a comment explaining the RFC 8628 device-start leg.) terraform fmt clean.

Why this fixes it

• entire login POSTs to /device_authorization to start the device flow — no browser, no Access creds → CF Access returned its HTML challenge → the CLI's JSON decode threw your exact error.
• The device-code poll (/oauth/token) and the back-channel exchange were already bypassed; only the start leg was missing. The browser approval page stays Access-gated (you're in a browser there, so it's fine).

To take effect

It's a working-tree edit only — not committed, not applied (infra deploys are your call). Review + terragrunt apply in cloudflare/partial.to/, then ENTIRE_AUTH_BASE_URL=https://eu.auth.partial.to entire login should work WARP-free. Want me to commit it / open a PR in the infra repo, or leave it for you?

Note this is separate from the CLI PR #1341 — different repo, no code dependency.

Restored your branch — your checkout is back to paul/mirror-sync-silence-eu-60m, working tree clean. My commit is safe on paul/cf-device-auth-bypass (branched off origin/main, one commit, fmt-clean).

Bottom line

Everything's done except the push, which is blocked on partial.to auth — and there's no GitHub remote to bypass it. The infra repo's entire:// origin lives on eukanuba.partial.to, which needs a partial.to login, and right now there's no usable partial.to context active. It's the chicken-and-egg: pushing the fix for partial.to device-login needs a partial.to login.

To get it pushed + PR'd

You have an eu.auth.partial.to context (from your earlier auth contexts). If its token is still valid:

Then tell me and I'll open the PR (gh pr create -R entirehq/infra --base main), or run it yourself.

If that context's token is also expired (so you can't push or entire login to partial.to), the clean escape hatch is to apply this change without the round-trip:

That deploys the /device_authorization bypass → entire login to partial.to starts working → then push the branch and open the PR normally.

Want me to draft the gh pr create body now so it's ready to fire the moment the branch lands on GitHub?

Fixed. Root cause: Cloudflare caps destinations per Access app, and auth_token_bypass was already at the limit — 4 → 6 tripped "too many destinations" (code 12130). The PUT failed, so that app stayed at its old 4 destinations in Cloudflare and the device bypass never got created.

Fix (committed c6734568 on paul/cf-device-auth-bypass)

• auth_token_bypass restored to its original 4 destinations (no change from what's live → no diff to apply).
• New dedicated app auth_device_authorization_bypass with the two {us,eu}.auth.partial.to/device_authorization destinations + the same full-bypass policy. terraform fmt clean.

Re-apply

This time the plan just creates the new app (auth_token_bypass is untouched), so no cap to hit. After it applies, ENTIRE_AUTH_BASE_URL=https://eu.auth.partial.to entire login should work WARP-free.

Then

Once that login works, the push unblocks:

and I'll open the PR (gh pr create -R entirehq/infra --base main).

Note the branch now has two commits (the original + this split-fix); the net branch-vs-main diff is correct (4-dest auth_token_bypass + new device app). I didn't squash — that'd mean rewriting history, and a squash-merge will collapse it anyway. Holler if you'd rather I clean it up.